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SITUATION

I

PROTECTION BY VESSELS OF WAR
States X andY, non-American states, are at war.
State Z, an American state, is an ally of state Y.
Other states are neutral.
States B, C, and D are American states parties
to the Habana treaties of 1928/ the ~{ontevideo
treaties of 1933, 2 and the Buenos .Aires treaties of
1936, 3 but state Z is not a party to any of the above
treaties though carefully observing international
law.
States L, M, and N are non-American states and
not parties to any of the above treaties.
(a) The Ba1ni, an innocent merchant vessel in
ballast lawfully flying the flag of state B, is passing
through a strait which is fifteen miles wide and is
between two islands belonging to state Y when it
is seized eight miles from land by the Y osu, a vessel
of war of Y, on the ground that this area is a proclaimed war zone and closed to all ships. The
Ba1ni requests protection of the Bos~t, a vessel of
war of state B, which proceeds immediately and
overtakes the Ban~i and the Yos'lt in the strait seven
1

Convention on maritime neutrality. 1935 Naval War College, International Law Situations, p. 115; Convention concerning the rights
and duties of states in the event of civil strife. Ibid, p. 123.
2
Additional protocol to the general convention of inter-AmP-rican
conciliation. Post, p. 158.
a Convention for the maintenance, preservation, and reestablishment of peace. Post, p. 160.
Additional protocol relative to non-intervention. Post, p. 169.
Convention to coordinate, extend, and a~sure the fulfillment of the
existing treaties between the American States. Post, p. 163.
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n1iles from la11d. What action may the Bosu lawfully take~
(b) The Z OS1t,, a vessel of war of state Z, captures
and puts a prize crew on board the La1ni, a merchai1t vessel lawflllly flying the flag of state L and
bound for a port of L, passing through the same
strait "\vith a cargo of bananas consig11ed to a merchant in an inland state bordering on state X. The
Losn, a vessel of war of state L, later meets the
La1ni five miles from land. What actio11 1nay the
Los1t lawfully take if asked to protect the La1ni?
(c) State X, not able effectively to blockade any
port of Y, proclaims all articles bo11nd for Y to be
contraband. State C has not included oranges,
though state D has included oranges in the list of
prohibited exports. The Xal1t, a vessel of war of
state X, seizes on the ground of carriage of contraband the Cerni, a merchant vessel, with a cargo of
oranges two-thirds from state C and one-third from
stateD, lawfully flying the flag of state C and bound
for a non-military port of Y. What action may
the Cosa, a vessel of war of state C, lawfully take
when appealed to by the Cerni?
(d) The N a1ni, a merchant vessel la,vfully flying the flag of stateN, calls at a port of stateD and
takes on board . passengers, nationals of state D,
bo11nd for state X. State D has prohibited the
saili11g of its 11ationals in the war area during the
hostilities. The J...T a11ti also has on board passengers, nationals of states L a11d l\f bound for state X.
The Z os1tJ visits the N a1ni 100 miles at sea off state
N and is removing the passengers, nationals of
states D, L, and M, 'vhen the Losn approaches and
the nationals of L request protection. The nationals of D and M also request protection of the
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Dos~t,

an approaching vessel of war of state D.
What action may the Losu and Dosu lawfully take~
SOLUTION

(a) (1) The commander of Bosu should ra1se
question with the commander of Y osu as to whether
the Bami has not been illegally seized on high seas
and request the release of the Bami.
(2) The commander of the Bostt should report to
the Navy Department his action.
(b) (1) As the Z ostt-t has placed a prize crew on
the Lami and is sending the La1ni in for adjudication, the commander of the Lostt may take no further action other than to inquire reasons for
capture.
(2) The commander of the Lostt should report
the circumstances to Navy Department.
(c) As oranges may legally be declared contraband and as the entire cargo of the Ce11~i may be
liable to condemnation, the capture of the Cemi by
the Xaltt is lawful and the commander of the Cosa
may take no further action other than to report the
facts.
(d) (1) The passengers on the Na1ni being under the jurisdiction of state N, no third state may
take action in regard to their safe removal in time
of vvar by a vessel of war of state Z. This becomes
primarily a matter of concern betwee11 states N
and Z.
(2) The commanders of the Losu and Dos~t may
request reasons for the action of tl1e Z osu and report the facts to their Navy Departments for appropriate action. The subsequent treatment of the
11ationals of D, L, and M may become a matter for
action of those states.
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Notes
Pan A1n er1"can treatles.( a) General survey.-President Coolidge 1n
opening the Sixth International Conference of
An1erican States, Habana, January 16, 1928, reviewing the history of the .American states and
their methods of ''resolving international differences without resort to force,'' said:
"If these conferences mean anything, they 1nean the bringing o£ all our people more definitely and more completely
under the reign of law. After all, it is in that direction
that we must look with the greatest assurance for human
progress. 'Ve can make no advance in the realm of econoinics, "\Ve can do nothing for education, we can accomplish
but little even in the sphere of religion, until human affairs
are brought within the orderly rule of law. The surest refuge of the weak and the oppressed is in the law. It is preeminently the shield of small nations. This is necessarily a
long, laborious process, which must broaden out from precedent to precedent, from the general acceptance of principle
to principle." (Report of the Delegates of the United
.States of .A.merica, p. 68.)

The aspiration for peace was further voiced i11
-the pronouncement of President Roosevelt, 1933, of
a ''good neighbor'' policy. Secretary Hull at the
opening of the Buenos .Aires Conference in 1936
had among other objectives enunciated as vitally
important for the Western World ''a common policy of neutrality'' and that "international law
should be reestablished, revitalized, and strengthened.'' On his return, speaking of the \Vork of the
Conference, he said:
"This "~elding of inter-American friendship has now become a po,verful, positive force for peace. throughout the
'vorld." (,January 13, 1937.)

PAN Al\IERICAN TREATIES
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The Conventions of 1928, 1933, and 1936 show the
tre11d of American states toward a policy of peace,
and were 11egotiated with view to advancing that
policy. Accordingly th·ey should be interpreted in
this spirit.
It should be noted that by becoming party to the
above convention of 1936, a state commits itself to
obligations under five other agreements, 1923-193371
1nentioned in Article I.
(b) l1tter-Arnerica1t consultation and cooperation.-The ''Convention to coordinate, extend, and
assure the fulfillment of the existing treaties between the American states,'' Buenos Aires, December 23, 1936, affirms the loyalty of American states
to the principles of treaties of recent years aiming
to assure peace without the use of force. These
include the treaties negotiated among American
states such as those of Santiago, May 3, 1923 ; Paris,
August 28, 1928; Washington, January 5, 1929;
Rio de Janeiro, October 10, 1933.
Article 6 of the Convention of ·Buenos Aires,
December 23, 1936, provides :
"'Vithout prejudice to the universal principles of neutrality provided for in the case of an international war outside
of America and without affecting the duties contracted by
those American States members of the League of Nations,
the High Contracting Parties reaffirm their loyalty to the
principles enunciated in the five agreements referred to in
Article 1, and they· agree that in the case of an outbreak of
hostilities or threat of an outbreak of hostilities between two
or more of them, they shall, through consultation, immediately endeavor to adopt in their character as neutrals a
con1mon and solidary attitude, in order to discourage or
prevent the spread or prolongation of hostilities.
"'Vith this object, and having jn mind the diversity of
cases and circumstances, they 1nay consider the imposition
of prohibitions or restrictions on the sale or shipment of_=
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arn1s, n1unitions and in1plements of 'Yar, loans or other financial help to the States in conflict, in accordance 'vith the
n1unicipal legislation of the High Contracting Parties, and
"~ithout detritnent to their obligations derived from other
treaties to ·which they are or may become parties." Pan
An1erican Union. Congress and Conference Series, No. 22,
pp. 37, 39; post p. 166.)

In this article the America11 states agree under
certain circumstances that "they shall, through
consultation, immediately endeavor to adopt in
their character as neutrals a common and solidary
attitude in order to discourage or prevent the
SIJread or prolongation of hostilities'' ''without
IJrejudice to the universal principles of neutrality''
or "treaties to which they are or may become
parties.'' The American states ''in their character
as neutrals'' propose in their ''common and
solidary attitude'' ''the imposition of prohibitions
or restrictions on the sale or shipment of arms,
munitio11s, and implements of war, loans or other
financial help to the states in conflict, in accordance
\vith the municipal legislation of the High Contracting Parties, and \vithout detriment to their
obligations derived from other treaties to which
they are or may become parties.''
(c) Fuljill1nent of existing treaties, 1936.-0n
July 15, 1937, the President ratified on behalf of the
United States the ''Convention to coordinate, extend, and assure the fulfillment of the existing
treaties between the American states'' which was
;_s igned at Buenos Aires, December 23, 1936. This
is a comprehensive regional agreement by which
-there is recognized differences in the binding force
.of certain regional treaties and of universal prin.ciples of international law applicable outside the
.Americas.
/

~L-\IXTENAN CE

OF PEACE

7

In Article 1 of this Convention the agreements to
'vhich the ''Governments represented at the InterAmerican Conference for the :1tiaintenance of
Peace'' are bound are enumerated:
"Taking into consideration that, by the Treaty to A void
and Prevent Conflicts between the American States, Signed
at Santiago, ~1ay 3, 1923,4 (known as the Gondra Treaty),
the High Contracting Parties agree that all controversies
which it has been impossible to settle through d!plomatic
channels or to submit to arbitration in accordance with existing treaties shall be submitted for investigation and report
to a Commission of Inquiry:
"That by the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed
at Paris on August 28, 1928,5 (known as the ICellogg-Briand
Pact, or Pact of Paris), the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples .that
they condemn recourse to \Var for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of
national policy in their relations with one another;
"That by the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation,6 signed at Washington, January 5, 1929, the High
Contracting Parties agree to submit to the procedure of conciliation all controversies between them, which it may not
have been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, and
to establish a "Commission of Conciliation" to carry out the
obligations assumed in the Convention;
"That by the General Treaty of Inter-American Arb!tration,7 signed at Washington, January 5, 1929, the High Contracting Parties bind themselves to submit to arbitration,
subject to certain exceptions, all differences between them of
an international character, which it has not been possible to
adjust by diplomacy and which are juridical in their nature
by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application
of the principles of law, and, moreover, to create a procedure
of arbitration to be :followed; and
Post, p. 132.
1029 Naval War College International Law Situation, p. 104.
e 46 Stat. 2209; post, p. 146.
~ 49 Stat. 3153; post, p. 138.
4
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"That by the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation,8
signed at Rio de Janeiro, October 10, 1933, (kno,Yn as the
Saavedra Lan1as Treaty), the High Contracting Parties soletnnly declare that they condemn wars of aggression in their
n1utual relations or in those with other States and that the
settlement of disputes or controversies between thetn shall
be effected only by pacific means which have the sanction of
international law, and also declare that as between them territorial questions must not be settled by violence, and that
they ·will not recognize any territorial arrangement not obtained by pacific Ineans, nor the validity of the occupation
or acquisition of territories brought about by force of arn1s,
and, moreover, in a case of non-compliance with these obligations, the contracting States ~ndertake to adopt, in their
character as neutrals, a common and solidary attitude and to
exercise the political, juridical or economic means authorized
by international law, and to bring the influence of public
opinion to bear, without., however, resorting to intervention,
either diplotnatic or armed, subject nevertheless to the attitude that may be incumbent upon them by virtue of their
collective treaties ; and, further, undertake to create a procedure of conciliation;
"The High Contracting Parties reaffirm the obligations
entered into to settle, by pacific n1eans, controversies of an
international character that may arise between them."
(Treaty Series, No. 926.)

(d) Pa1L A.1nerica1L solidarity, 1936.-At the
Buenos Aires Conference, 1936, a formal statement
of common aspiration was agreed upon by the
t'venty-one American s~ates. It was stated in the
Declaration of Principles of·Inter-Americail Solidarity and Cooperation, that
"The Governments of the American Republics, having
considered:
"That they have a con11non likeness in their den1ocratic
fortn of governtnent, and their common ideals of peace and
justice·, manifested in the several rreaties and Conventions
I!

49 Stat. 336.'3, 3375 ; post, p. 152.
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'vhich they have signed for the purpose of constituting a
purely American syste1n tending to,Yards the preservation of
peace, the proscription of 'var, the har1nonious development
of their commerce and of their cultural aspirations demonstrated in all of their political, economic, social, scientific
and artistic activities ;
"That the existence of continental interests obliges them to
1naintain solidarity of princi pies as the basis of life of the
relations of each to every other American nation;
"That Pan Americanism, as a principle of American In~
ternational La,v, by 'vhich is understood a moral union of
all of the American Republics in defense of their common
interests based upon the most perfect equality and reciprocal
respect for their rights of autonomy, independence and free
development, requires the proclamation of principles of
American International Law; and
"That it is necessary to consecrate the principle of American solidarity in all non-continental conflicts, especially since
those limited to the American Continent should find a peaceful sol uti on by the means established by the Treaties and
Conventions now in force or in the instruments hereafter to
be executed.
"The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of
Peace Declares :
"1. That the American Nations, true to their republican
institutions, proclaim their absolute juridical liberty, their
unrestricted respect for their several sovereignty and the
existence of a common democracy throughout Amer:ca;
"2. That every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of
America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the
initiation of the procedure of consultation provided for in
the Convention for the ~Iaintenance, Preservation and Reestabl:shment of Peace, executed at this Conference; and
"3. That the following principles are accepted by the
international American community;
" (a) Proscription of territorial conquest and that, in consequence, no acquisition made through violence shall be
recognized ;
"(b) Intervention by one State in the internal or external
affairs of another State is condemned;
93707-39-2
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" (c ) Forcible collection of pecuniary debts is illegal; and
" (d) Any difference or dispute bet,Yeen American nations,

" ·hatever its nature or origin, shall be settled by the methods
of conciliation, or :full arbitration, or through operation of
international justice." (Pan American Union. Congress
and Conference Series, No. 22, p. 60.)
Observa1~ce

of i1~ternatio1~alla~v.-These conventions of recent years among American states have
not merely affirmed the purpose to fulfill existing
treaty agreements but in many articles have affirmed the intention to support international law.
In general this has been the case in regard to matiers to which the conventions do not specifically refer. There would, therefore, be a large field of
international law to which the usually accepted
principles \vould apply. This \vould be the case in
most areas of maritime and fluvial jurisdiction,
both in peace and in war. The jurisdiction over
straits has been a subject for consideration for
many years and has not been covered in a special
American convention.
In most maritime matters the generally accepted
international law would apply among American
states without reference to special treaties. Questions as to straits have been discussed from early
·d ays of international law to recent times.
G?~oti~us on limits of strait.-After mentioning
the acquisition of rights over rivers, Grotius in
1625 says:
"In the light o:f the example just given it would appear
that the sea also can be acquired by him who holds the lands
or both s!des, even though it may extend above as a bay, or
above and below as a strait, provided that the part o£ the sea
in question is not so large that, when compared with the
lands on both sides, it does not seem a part o:f them." (De
Jure Belli ac Pacis [Carnegie Classic], Bk. II, chap. III,
viii.)

CO~VENTION
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From the days of Grotius and Bynkershoek, attempts have been made by many writers to make
more definite the limits and nature of jurisdictional rights of adjacent states over narrow seas
and straits. For this purpose conventions have
often been concluded even in recent times.
((Straits'' conventio1~, Montreux, July 20,1936.The straits which for many years have received the
most constant attention are the waters connecting
the Aegean and Black Seas. These waters include
''the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term 'Straits'." The use of these waters had
been regtilated by many agreements particularly
since the Treaty of Adrianople, 1829. The Convention of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, had regulated
the use of the "Straits," but the Convention of
Montreux, July 20, 1936, replaced the provisions of
the Convention of Lausanne. The expression ''not
being a belligerent'' replaces the word ''neutral.''
Article 5 of the Montreux convention provides
that:
"In time of 'var, Turkey being belligerent, merchant vessels not belonging to a country at war with Turkey shall
enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits on
condition that they do not in any 'vay assist the enemy.
"Such vessels shall enter the Straits by day and their transit shall be effected by the route which shall in each case be
indicated by the Turkish authorities." (173 League of
Nations Treaty Series, p. 213; 31 American Journal of
International Law, Supplement, p. 4.)

.Article 20 further provides that:
"In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, the provisions
o£ Articles 10 to 18 shall not be applicable; the passage o£
warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government." (Ibid, p. 8.)
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It is presumed i11 .Article 21 that Turkey, when_
threatened with war, will make reasonable provi-·
sio11 for the passage of vessels of \var which do not
belong to the threatening state.
Regulations restricting passage of non-belligerent merchant vessels to certain routes and to entrance by day i11 such narrow waters as the
''Straits '' seem, however, to be reasonable.
This Article 5, above, is a material modification
of the Convention of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, which
is as follows:
2, Annex 1 (c). "1n time of 'war, Turkey being ,z
belligerent.
"Freedom of navigation for neutral vessels and neutral
non-military aircraft, if the vessel or aircraft in question
does not assist the enemy, .Particularly by carrying contraband, troops or enemy nationals. Turkey will have the right
to visit and search such vessels and aircraft, and for this
purpose aircraft are to alight on the ground or on the sea in
such areas as are specified and prepared for this· purpose by
Turkey. The rights of Turkey to apply to enemy vessels
the measures allowed by international la'v are not affected.
"Turkey will have full power to take such measures as she
1nay consider necessary to prevent enemy vessels from using
the Straits. These measures, how·ever, are not to be of such
a nature as to prevent the free passage of neutral vessels,
and Turkey agrees to provide such vessels with either the
necessary instructions or pilots for the above purpose.'·'
(28 League of Nations Treaty Series, p. 115; 18 A. J. I. L.
[1924], Supplement, p. 55.)
ARTICLE

Article 20 of the Montreux Convention above
gives to Turkey mtlch greater control of the passage of the "Straits" than was provided under the
Convention of Lausanne:
ARTICLE

belligerent.

2, Annex 2 (c). "In time of war, Turkey being

DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS
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" Complete freedo1n of passage for neutral "~arships, with-out any formalities, or tax, or ·charge whatever, but under
the same limitations as in paragraph 2 (a).
"The measures taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships
:and aircraft from using the Straits are not to be of such a
nature as to prevent the free passage of neutral ships and
aircraft, and Turkey agrees to provide the said ships and air-craft 'vith either the necessary instructions or pilots for the
above purpose.
"Neutral military aircraft 'Yill make the passage of the
Straits at their o'Yn risk and peril, and will submit to investigation as to their character. For this purpose aircraft are
to alight on the ground or on the sea in such areas as are
:specified and prepared for this purpose by Turkey."

It is evident that even in regard to the Bosphorus
and Dardanelles, long subject to international regulation, a final adjustment may not have been
reached. Oth·er areas have often been placed under
special restriction, but not always without protest
by other states.
Defensive sea areas, United States.-An act,
March 4, 1917, provided that whoever shall",villfully'l or wantonly violate any duly authorized and
promulgated order or regulation of the President governing
persons or vessels within the limits of defensive sea areas,
'vhich defensive sea areas are hereby authorized to be established by order of the President from time to time as may be
necessary in his discretion for purposes of national defense,
shall be punished, on conviction thereof in a district or cir-c uit court of appeals of the United States for the district or
·circuit in which the offense 'vas committed, or into which the
offender is first brought, by a fine of not more than $5,000, or
by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or by
both, in the discretion of the court." ( 39 Stat. 1194; 1918
Naval "\Var College, International La'v Documents, p. 162.)

This act applied in time of peace provided for
penalty to be determined by the district or circuit
eourt. Defensive sea areas were ~stablished under
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this act before the United States became a belligerent as in the case of Chesapeake Bay, Hampton
Roads, and more than t'venty-five other areas on
.April5, 1917. Entrance to these areas was prohibited except a.s prescribed in conditions as to place,
route, speed, conduct, etc. Failure to observe these
regulations subjected the offender to the use of
necessary force as well as prosecution.
The exercise of control over defensive sea areas
or other similar areas may give rise to controversy or to questions of conflict of authority in such
areas.
Navy regulatio1~s, U1~it'ed States.-As a general
principle a state is under obligation to protect tl1e
lives and property of its citizens when in danger
and merchant vessels lawfully en1ployed. In some
exceptional cases the United States had in early
treaties agreed to protect the lives and property
of citizens of other states. The general obligation
as to injury or threatened injur.y to citizens or
property is stated in the U11ited States Navy·
Regulations as follows:
"722. On occasions where injury to the United States or to
citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of
the principles of internationalla\v or treaty rights, the commander in chief shall consult \vith the diplo1natic representati Ye or consul of the United States, and take such steps as the
gra Yity of the case demand, reporting immediately to the
Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for
any action taken by a naval force, ho,vever, rests wholly upon
the con1manding officer thereof.
"723. The use of force against a foreign and friendly state,
or against anyone \vithin the territories thereof, is illegal.
"1~he right of self-preservation, ho,vever, is a right which
belongs to States as \Yell as to individuals, and in the case of
States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and
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its possess:ons, and the lives and property of its citizens
against arbitrary violence, actual or in1pending, whereby the
State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of selfpreservation can not be defined beforehand, but must be left.
to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and
forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of
peace otherwise than as an application of the right of selfpreservation as above defined. It must be used only as a
last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely
necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be
exercised '\vith a view to inflicting punishment for acts
already committed."

Under these provisions action b}r naval forces is
to a high degree limited. Except in time of vvar in
which ~he United States is a belligerent, there
"\vould rarely arise a condition of arbitrary violence, actual or i1npending, "'vhereby the State or
its citizens may suffer irreparable injury."
Tl1ese regulations of the United States are in
accord with generally accepted practice and seem
essential for the protection of recognized fundamental rights of state existence.
Restrt:ctiorts o1t t1·avel.-Under the Act of ~fay 1,
1937, 9 amendi11g prior legislation the earlier provisions on "travel on vessels of belligerent states"
were repeated. This Act if applied in Situation I
made it possible for the President of the United
States to "find that there exists a state of 'var bet\veei1, or amo11g, two or more foreign states'' and
to ''proclaim such fact. ''
Section 9 of the Act of ~Iay 1, 1937, states that"v.VheneYer the President shall have issued a proclamation
under the authority of section 1 of this Act it shall there9

Post, pp. 171, 181.
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after be unla,vful for any citizen of the United States to
travel on any vessel of the state or states named
in such proclamation, except in accordance 'vith such rules
and regulations as the President shall prescribe: Provided,
however, "That the provisions of this section shall not apply
to a citizen of the United States traveling on a vessel 'vh9se
voyage was begun in advance o£ the date of the President's
prochunation, and \Yho had no opportunity to diseontinue his
voyage after that date: And provided further, That they
shall not apply under ninety days after the date of the President's proclamation to a citizen of the United States r-eturning from a foreign state to the United States. Whenever, in
the President's judgment, the conditions \vhich have caused
him to issue his procla1nation have ceased to exist, he shall
reYoke his proclamation and the provisions o£ this section
shall thereupon cease to apply 'vith respect to the state or
states named in such proclamation,· except 'vith respect to
offenses committed prior to such revocation." (50 Stat. 121,
127.)

This act sho\vs the attitude of the United States
toward travel upon vessels of certain states in time
of a Presidentially proclai1ned \Var. The act, ho\vever, applies merely to the "vessel of the state or
states named in such proclamation'' and would
place no limitation upon travel on vessels of other
states 11ot parties in the conflict. The penalty for
violation of tl1is law is under the domestic law of
the United States as prescribed in Section 12 and
not under international la\v.
A state may prohibit its citizens from traveling
in a specified manner and penalize them in case of
violation of the prohibition, but stlch a la\v does not
confer upon a foreign state any authority to interfere with such transit. In vessels under a foreign
flag, the authority of the flag prevails, and in case
Df interference with this authority in violation of
Tight, recourse rests in the state concerned.

NEUTRALITY
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N eutrality.-The concept of neutrality has
slowly developed. The support that the idea of
neutrality has received has varied and at times has
been determined by policy of the states concerned.
In ancient times it was usually held that in time of
war, when a state was near enough to a combatant
to feel the effects of the war, that state would be
on one or the other side in the struggle. As belligerents resorted to maritime warfare contacts
with non-belligerents became common and the risk
of unduly offending a non-belligerent became a
matter of serious significance, while the risk which
the non-belligerent might run in offending the belligereilt might be immediately apparent. Maritime commerce in war time introduced matters of
policy often influencing both belligerents to avoid
irritating a state having large resources or easily
ab~e to make po\verful alliances.
Some of the concepts of war became more clearly
defined under Gentilis (1552-1608) and Grotius
(1583'--1645). Bynkershoek (1673-1743) in writing upon war had a chapter on "How War Affects
Neutrals.'' ( Quaestionum Juris Publici, Lib. I,_
c. ix.) At the beginning of this chapter he says
''Non hostes appelo, qui neutrarum, partium sunt,
nee ex foedere his illisve quicquam de bent; si quid
debeant, Foederati sunt, non simpliciter amici,,.
which may be read, "I call those neutrals who are
of neither party, and do not by treaty owe anything
to the one or the other; if they owe anything they
are allied, not simply friends.'' The word neutrality had been used hundreds of years before the
eighteenth century and references in treaties and
elsewhere to the la\v of neutrality had been frequent. Bynl\:ershoek in 1737, however, contributed
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111uch to,vard clarifying the concepts of neutrality,
co11traband, free ships, free goods, etc. Of course,
states having a large export trade \vere averse to
interference \vith co1nmerce, and such a state, if
neutral, \vould be in a positio11 to be of service to
one or both belligerents as a source of supply. The
law of maritime neutrality \Vas also developing
co11currently with the law applied in admiralty and
prize courts, some early evidences of which were
seen in the fourteenth century. The printed reports of the decision of Lord Stowell from the end
of the eighteenth century gave great impetus to
the study of and respect for prize law.
The gradt1al substitution of a professional navy
for the irregular methods of maritime \Varfare introduced direct respo11sible state control and made
the dema11d for observance of law more tenable.
Comrnon attitude.-Identical provisions are included in many bilateral treaties relating to war
and neutrality, particularly since the early eighteenth century. The provisions in regard to visit
and search, etc., of the first treaty of the United
States "rith France, February 6, 1776, were repeated in many later treaties, indicating a common
attitude 11pon this subject. Otl1er subjects have
been similarly treated. This does not imply, however, that such bilateral treaties become generally
binding but only that each state js bound to act in
the manner agreed upon in its relations to the other
party to the specific treaty.
· The fact that identic provisions were common to
many bilateral treaties tended to give such provisions the \veigbt of law in international courts.
The many identic lists of contraband during the
nineteenth century gave support to the idea cur-
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-rent at the Hague Peace Conferences that a multilateral agreement could be reached upon tl1e articles to be included in the category of contraband.
The attempt to obtain general assent to a list as
.e11umerated in the Declaration of London, 1909,
was not successful in the ear~y days of the World
War.
Attempts 'vere, however, made to agree upon com_m on courses or principles of action upon topics or
in regions more or less extended, as in the Hague
.Peace Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and in the
rules of neutrality of Denmark, Norway, and
s,veden in 1912.
American solidarity, 1914.-During the World
vVar, while the United States was neutral, there
-, vere many proposals looking to agreements by
American states upon common action to protect
neutral rights or to extend neutral protection~
Propositions for the defining of areas about Ameri·can coasts from which belligerent vessels of war
.s hould be excluded or 'vithin which they could exercise no rights as regards neutral commerce were
eommon. In a lengthy memorandum from the
Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Department of State, November 10, 1914, the problems are set forth. The concluding part is as
follo,vs:
"In the present European war, which has unfortunately
already been extended to Asia, it is not admissible that
A1nerica, and especially South America, should also become
a battlefield. The American countries are not bound up
with the European nations either politically or by reason of
their interests. 'rhe hospitality 'vhich they systematically
accord to everything from abroad which may contribute to
their advancement and development can not be extended to
the point of permitting the coasts of the An1erican Continent
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to be used for the maintenance of a permanent system of
persecution of n1erchant vessels and for an intermittent and
sterile struggle which benefits no one and injures all.
"For this reason the Peruvian Government believes that
the time has come for making felt the joint action of all the
American Republics to guarantee the inviolability of theirtrade routes by free:ng them throughout their extent from
the effects of the hostilities of the belligerent naval forces.
An agreement to this effect, asserting that America will not
permit its commerce ·within the maritime areas corresponding to the continent (which area may be considered marked
by a line equ:distant from the other continents on both the·
Pacific and the Atlantic sides) to be subject to the contingencies of the present European war, would afford a sufficient
guarantee to mitigate at least in part the consequences of the·
crisis which has already begun to be felt very acutely, and it
would enforce respect for the interests affected, such respect
not seeming thus far to have entered the minds of the belligerent powers.
''It is permissible to suppose that such an attitude would
not be regarded unfavorably by these po,vers themselves,.
since it would benefit them like,vise, by virtue of the guarantees which would be granted to their merchant vessels, besides relieving them of the obligation of detaching squadrons
at such a distance to protect the vessels of their nationality
or to pursue those under the enen1y's flag.'' (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1914, Supplement, p. 443.)

Other American states made somewhat similar
propositions and on December 8, 1914, the Governing Board of the Pan American Union passed a
resolution in which it declared:
"1. That the magnitude of the present European war presents new problems of international law, the solution of
"\vhich is of equal interest to the entire "~orld.
"2. That [in] the form in which the operations of the
belligerents are developing they redound to the injury of
the neutrals.
"3. That the principal cause for this result is that the·
resp~ctive rights of the belligerents and of the neutrals are:
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not clearly defined, notwithstanding that such definition is
demanded both by general convenience as by the spirit of
justice which doubtless animates the belligerents 'vith
respect to the interests of the neutrals.
"4. That considerations of every character call for a
definition of such rights as promptly as possible upon the
principle that liberty of commerce should not be restricted
beyond the point indispensable for military operations.
"On these grounds the Governing Board of the Pan
A1nerican Union resolves:
"1. A special commission of the same is hereby appointed,
to consist of nine members, of which the Secretary of State
of the United States shall form part, acting as chairn1an
thereof, e;n officio.
"2. This commission shall study the problems presented
by the present European 'var and shall submit to the Governing Board the suggestions it may deem of common interest. In the study of questions of a technical character,
this commission will consult the board of jurists. Each
government may submit to the committee such plans or suggested resolutions as may be deemed convenient, on the
different subjects that circumstances suggest.'' (Ibid,
p. 444.)

Venezuela proposed a congress of neutrals to
define "neutral rights and duties in the light of the
new conditions introduced by modern war'', and
that revised rules should be ''embodied in international law" as a "pledge of peace for the
future.'' To this end Venezuela also proposed a
league of neutrals to bring a neutral code into
operation.
Proposals for the neutralization of American
waters were made by many states. The Scandinavian states had at Malmo on December 20, 1914,
assumed an obligation to confer in case of difficulties in maintaining neutral rights, and intimated
in late 1914 that the cooperation of the United
States would be viewed with satisfaction. Italy
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also sho,ved a desire that its action should be'' along
parallel lines with that of the United States.''
Regional ~tnderstandi1~gs.-The Covena11t of the
League of Nations, for which President Wilson was
a 1nain protagonist, recog11ized i11 article 21 the desirability of n1ai11t ai11i11g ''regional understa11dings
like the l\fonroe doctri11e. '' This doctri11e was not
an international agreen1e11t, b11t a unilateral pronouncement of 011e powerf11l state i11 regard to its
policy i11 a specified area. Other regional 1lnderstandings have bee11 proposed for specified areas~
as the "ope11.door in China," etc., "\Vhich have later
been e1nbodied in inter11ational agreements as \vere
the U11derstandn1g in regard to China in the ''Nine
Po\ver Treaty" of the Washington Conference,
1922, which provided for ''full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned''
when the carrying out of the stip11lations of the
treaty seemed to be involved.
The events since 1922 have seemed to "\varra11t
the ''full and frank communication,'' but this has
11ot taken place in a11y effective manner.
American, solidarity, 1917.-The attempts . to
bring. about a comn1on attitude on neutrality prior
to 1917 had met with only moderate approval.
After the United States entered the \var there \Yas
some support for a conference of neutral An1erican
states, but soon this support becan1e so li1nited that
the proposed n1eeting was given up and a sentin1ent
i11 favor of the Per11vian proposition for a ''conference doctrine of solidarity with the United
States'' became general. American states soon
broke off relations with Germany, and Brazil declared war on October 26, 1917. Other states gave
special privileges. Costa Rica, El Salvador, and
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some other states placed their ports at the disposal
of the United States.
For many years regional agreements have been
common and in one sense any treaty may have a
regional significance. Many early treaties applied
to limited areas. Such treaties as those relating to
the balance of power or concert of powers were usually regional in application. It could scarcely be
expected that states having a common type of civilization and interest would not unite for common
ends. Alliances of varying nature were the characteristic of a long period of European diplomacy.
As competition among states increased, offensive
and defensive alliances followed. These were sometimes openly entered into and sometimes secret.
It was hoped that at the end of the World War
there would be a change in attitude of states and
that the world should be made safe "as against
force and selfish aggression.'' President Wilson
in his address to c·ongress, January 8, 1918, proposed as the first of his fourteen points in a ''programme of the world's peace":
"I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after
which there shall be no private international understandings
of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed ahvays :frankly
and in the public vie,v." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1918,.
Sup. 1, I, 15.)

In this address President Wilson also said:
"For such arrangements and covenants we are w·illing to
fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but
only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just
and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing
the chief provocations to war, which this programme does
remove." (Ibid., p. 16.)
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As to ho'v far the Treaty of Versailles embodied
tl1e ''fourteen points'' and achieved the aims of his
programme is a matter of difference of opinion.
Pan A1nerica1t treaties) 1823-1936.-To some degree there has been a feeling of solidarity among
the states of the American continent since the early
nineteenth century. The Congress of Panama
called under the influence of Bolivar in 1826 conten1plated a type of league of states. The idea was
kept before American states by other American conferences as at Lima (1847), at Santiago (1856), and
at Lima (1864). At the conference of 1864 a somewhat elaborate scheme for a league 'vas presented.
The Monroe Doctrine of the United States, from
1823, gave a sense of security to states in advocating
a united policy. Even in the Congress of Panama,
1826, some of the later principles of conciliation and
arbitration were advocated. The movement for
strengthening common bonds by the creation of a
Pan American Union developed rapidly from 1889
and meetings of representatives of the American
states became frequent. Each conference rnade contributions by discussing advanced projects for international peace and cooperation. The tentative
idea of a Pan American Union dating from 1889
was further elaborated at the Fourth Conference at
Buenos Aires in 1910.
The Sixth International Conference of American States, Habana, 1928, was considered of sucl1
importance that the President of the United States
visited Habana and made an address at the opening session emphasizing the need of ''continental
responsibility" and "international cooperation."
Delegations from each of the American republics
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were in attendance at this Habana Conference,
thus making its acts of significance for all the
.An1erican states. The scope of the Conference involved the signing of eleven conventions, sixty-two
resolutions, seven motions and four agreements.
Subsequent conferences at Montevideo and
Buenos Aires elaborated the work of the Habana
Confere11ce, and introduced new topics upon which
action has been taken.
As many of the conventions signed at these conferences have subsequently been ratified, there is a
considerable body of law common to the"American
states, relating to the tilne of peace, war, and neutrality. These conventions, binding upon American states, are not always in exact accord with the
accepted international obligations as understood
among non-American states.
The Conference at Buenos Aires, 1936, was
specifically called the Inter-American Conference
for the Maintenance of Peace and had as a background the recent war between Bolivia and Para. .
guay.
Haba1ta Oonventior~t, 1928.-0f the ten conventions signed at the Sixth International American
Conference, Habana, January 16-February 20,
1928, the Convention on Maritime Neutrality (1935
Naval War College, International Law Situations,
p. 115) contains provisions applicable in such a
war as that between X and Y. Many of these are
similar to those of Hague Convention XIII, 1907,
on Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime War.
The preamble of the Habana Convention on Maritiine Neutrality implies that tl1ere will be to some
93707-39-3
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degree concerted action by the Governments of the
Republics represented, which"Desiring that, in cas.e 'var breaks out bet,veen two or
more states the other states may, in the service of peace,
offer their good offices or mediation to bring the conflict to
an end, without such an action being considered as an
unfriendly act ;
"Convinced that, in case· this aim cannot be attained,
neutral states have equal interest in having their rights
respected by the belligerents ;
"Considering that neutrality is the juridical situation of
states which do not take part in the hostilities, and that it
creates rights and in1poses obligations of impartiality, 'vhich
should be regulated ;
"Recognizing that international solidarity requires that
the liberty of commerce should be ahvays respected, avoiding as far as possible unnecessary burdens for the neutrals;
"It being convenient, that as long as this object is not
reached, to reduce those burdens as n1uch as possible; and
"In the hope that it 'vill be possible to regulate the matter
sc that all interests concerned may have every desired
guaranty;
"Have resolved to formulate a convention to that effect
and have appointed the :follo,ving plenipotentiaries:"
(Ibid.)
Lirnitatio1~

on Habana

Co1~ve1~tio?~,

1928.-The

title of the Habana Convention on Maritime Neutrality, 1928, implied that the Convention applies
to a definite status. This status is set forth in the
preamble in the words, ''neutrality is the juridical situation of states \vhich do not take part in
hostilities, and * * * it creates rights and imposes obligations of impartiality, which should be
regulated.'' The Convention is divided into four
sections : ''Section I. Freedom of commerce in time
of \var; Section II. Duties and rights of belligerents; Section III. Rights and duties of neutrals;
Section IV. Fulfilment and observance of laws
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of neutrality.'' The text of this Convention refers
to previous laws and accepted rules and follows
some of the rules of the earlier Hague conventions.
Indeed, Article 28 specifically states that''The present convention does not affect obligations previously undertaken by the contracting parties through international agreements."

In signing this Convention, the delegations of
the United States and of Cuba made reservation
on the treatment of armed merchantmen, and Chile
on the transit of arms, munitions, etc., to a ''Mediterranean country.''
It was clearly shown that the Habana Conference of 1928 appreciated the difference between
war and civil strife, as a later convention was conclllded on the "Rights and Duties of States in the
Event of Civil Strife.'' At this time there was
therefore a defi11ite concept of neutrality in the
sense of international law.
Treaties of 1933.-Among the treaties of the
Seventh International Conference of American
States at Montevideo, 1933, was one on "The
Rights and Duties of States/' which again affirms
that "the present convention shall not affect obligations previously entered into by the high contracting parties by virtue of international agreements.'' (Article 12.) This provif:ion reaffirms
many conventional agreements upon neutrality.
The Anti-War Treaty on Non-Aggression and
Conciliation 9 signed at Rio de Janeiro, October 10,
1933, aimed to end 'vars of aggression and for territorial acquisition. This treaty refers to "\var and
neutrality.
• Post, p. 152.
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B1-te·nos .Aires, 1936.-Tlle Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Reestablishment of Peace,10 December 23, 1936, Article
II, refers to ''the event of war or a virtual state of
\var between American states'' and also refers to
''the standards of international morality.'' An additional protocol declares ''inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly,
and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the parties,'' but
"mutual consultation" 1nay follow \vith view to
conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement.
Passe1~gers bou1~d for belligerent ports.-The
treatment of persons having a belligerent destination has long been . an i1nportant question. Provisions in regard to sucl1 persons appeared in
treaties in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.
The T rent case, November 8, 1861, \Vhen an American vessel of war required the surrender of Mason
and Slidell by the British mail steamer, emphasized the need of definite rules. It was maintained
that the persons should not be removed, but the
vessel, in case of probable carriage of enemy milit ary persons, should be brought into port.
The consideration of the matter of carriage of
enemy persons led to the formulation of Article
47 of the unratified Declaration of London in 1909:
"Any individual embodied in the armed force of the
enen1y, and who is found on board a neutral merchant vessel, may be made a prisoner of 'var, even though there be
no ground for the capture of the vessel." ( 1909 Naval War
College, I nternational Law Topics, p. 111.)
10

Post, p. 160.
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The comment on this article explains the point
of view in 1909:
"Individuals embodied in the armed military or naval
forces of a belligerent may be on board a neutral merchant
vessel which is visited and searched. If the vessel is subject!
to condemnation, the cruiser will capture her and take her to
one of her o'vn ports with the persons on board. Clearly the
soldiers or sailors of the enemy State wil1 not be set free,
but will be considered as prisoners of 'var. It may happen
that the case 'vill not be one for the capture of the shipfor instance, because the master does not kno:w the status
of an individual who had the appearance of an ordinary passenger. Must the soldier or soldiers on board the vessel be
set free~ That does not appear admissible. The belligerent
cruiser cannot be compelled to set free active enemies who
are physically in her power and are more dangerous than
this or that contraband article; naturally she must act with
great discretion, and it is at her own responsibility that she
requires the surrender of these individuals, but the right
to do so is hers; it has thus been thought necessary to explain the point.'' (Ibid.)

In Article 45 of tl1e Declaration of London, there
is reference to ''the transport of individual passengers who are embodied in the armed force of
the enemy" or "persons who with the knowledge
of the ovvner'' during the voyage, lend direct
assistance to the operations of the enemy.''
There is no doubt as to the liability of the vessel
to be seized on the ground of unneutral seryice in
case of such transport, but the removal of such
persons from the neutral vessel had usually b~en
opposed till the t'ventieth century. The interference with neutral shipping involved in bringing in
a large neutral passenger liner, because a single
soldier of an enemy was on board, came to-be regarded as unnecessary and it was conceded that
the passenger might be turned over to the visiting
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vessel of war. The liability would be assumed by
the belligerent. Some states have taken positions
involving an approval of action which still would
be regarded as extreme, as in the Italian regulations of 1927, which provide:
"Persons belonging to or intending to join the enemy's
armed forces found on board a neutral vessel may be made
prisoners of "\var, even though the ship be not subject to capture." (Norme de Diritto Marittimo di Guerra, Ron1a, 1927~
Article 78.)

The Instructions for the Navy of the United ·
States, June 1917, stated that the persons ''must be
actually ·embodied in the military service of the
enemy. Reservists or other persons subject to military duty but not formally incorporated in military
service are not included.''
The status and treatment of en~my persons on
neutral vessels received somewhat full treatment at
the Naval War College in 1928 (192'8 Naval War
College, I11ternational Law Situations, pp. 73-108).
The discussion in 1928 led to the statement that,
"while neutrals may after arriving in a belligerent
state, enroll in the military serviee, this does not
subject them to interference prior to entering
enemy service." It was also concluded that"the present rules in regard to capture do not confer a right
to re1nove from a neutral merchant vessel, when on a regular
voyage, passengers of enemy nationality on the ground that
£ron1 their age or capacity they may be called for military
service."

There would not be a general obligation resting
upon all neutral vessels of war to interfere in cases
in \vhich neutral vessels lawfully flying other flags
than that of the vessel of war might be concern·ed.
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Habana Convention, 1928, on transit.-The passage of goods across .American states is as among
the parties to the Habana 1928 Convention on Maritime Neutrality regulated by Article 22, which specifically refers to inland states :
"Neutral states are not obligated to prevent the export or
transit at the expense o£ any one o£ the belligerents o£ arms,
munitions and in general o£ anything which may be useful
to their Inilitary forces.
"Transit shall be permitted when, in the event o£ a war
be!ween two American nations, one o£ the belligerents is a
mediterranean country, having no-other means o£ supplying
itself, provided the vital interests o£ the country through
which transit is requested do not suffer by the grantin·g
thereof." (1935 Naval War College, International Law
Situations, p. 120.)

In the first paragraph the neutral state is "not
obligated to prevent the export or transit." In the
second paragraph, "transit shall b·e permitted."
Cargoes contraband.-In December 1915 certain
boxes of Valentia oranges were seized on N orvvegian steamships, N orne, Grove, and H arda1tger,
011 a voyage from Valentia, Spain, to Rotterdam,
Holland. The fruit vvas to be sold at auctio11 in
Rotterdam. Tl1e Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council on appeal from the British Prize Court
stated:
"At the date o£ the seizure the oranges had been declared
conditional contraband. * * * '\Vhether goods in any particular instance are contraband, by application o£ the doctrine o£ continuous voyage, is a question o£ £act. Under the
terms o£ the Order in Council the appellants must discharge
the burden o£ proving that the destination, i£ the voyage had
not been interrupted, would have been innocent. When an
exporter ships goods under such conditions that he does not
retain control o£ their disposal after arrival at the port o£
delivery, and the control but £or their interception and seizure would have passed into the hands o£ some other persons,
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"·ho had the intention either to sell them to an enemy government or to send them to an enemy base of supply, then
the doctrine of continuous voyage becomes applicable, and
the goods on capture are liable to condemnation as contraband. The case for the respondent is that the cases of
oranges on arrival at Rotterdam 'vould have passed under
the control of Lutten and Sohn, of Hamburg." {1 A. C.
[1921] 765.)

The decision of the Prize Court condemning the
oranges as conditional contraband destined for an
enemy base \Vas affirmed. Whether all the opinion
" 7 0tlld have been affirmed had it not been for the
do1nestic Orders-in-Council is open to question, but
oranges bound for an enemy base of supply would
be conditional contraband. Similar decisions were
given as to conditional contraband in the German
Court (]fedea, 1 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengeri~hts 131) and in the French court (Athe1Les,
Fatichille, Jurisprudence Francaise en Matiere de
Prises, p. 428).
The H akan.-The H akan, a Svvedish merchant
vessel, \vas captured by a British vessel of \var .April
4, 1916, with a cargo of salted herrings. The H akan
\Vas bound to Lubeck in Germany. The British
Prize court condemned the ship and cargo. The
Judicial Comn1ittee of the Privy Council heard the
case on appeal.
"In their lordships' opinion, goods which are conditional
contraband can be properly condemned whenever the court
is of op jnion, under all the circumstances brought to its
kno,vledge, that they were probably intended to be applied
for "·arlike purposes, the J ong M argaretha. * * *
"In the present case Lubeck, the port of destination of the
goods, is undoubtedly a port used largely for the importation into Germany of goods from Norway and Sweden; but
it does not appear 'vhether it is used exclusively or at all as
a base of naval or military equipment. On the other hand,
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it is quite certain that the persons to whom the goods were
consigned at Lubeck were bound forthwith to hand them
over to the Central Purchasing Co., of Berlin, a company
appointed by the German Government to act under the
direction of the imperial chancellor for purposes connected
with the control of the food supplies rendered necessary by
the 'var. The proper inference seems to be that the goods in
question are in effect goods requisitioned by the Government
for the purposes of the war. It may be quite true that their
ultimate appiication, had they escaped capture, would have
been to feed civilians, and not the naval or military forces of
Germany ; but the general scarcity of food in Germany had
made the victualing of the civil population a war problem.
Even if the military or naval forces of Germany are never
supplied with salted herrings, their rations of bread or meat
may well be increased by reason of the possibility of supplying salted herrings to the civil population. Under these circumstances, the inference is almost irresistible that the goods
were intended to be applied for warlike purposes, and, this
being so, their lordships are of op:nion that the goods were
rightly condemned." ( [1918] A. C. 148; 1922 Naval vVar
College, International Law Decisions, p. 164.)

There is here introduced the idea of contraband
by substitution, which has often been advanced in
recent "\vars.
The ship itself "\vas also condemned on the ground
that authorities held that ''knowledge of the character of the goods on the part of the owner of the
ship is sufficient to justify condemnation of the
ship-at any rate, where the goods in question constitute a substantial part of the cargo.'' (Ib·id.)
Reservations 01~ contraband, 1lJ36.-In signing
the Buenos Aires, 1936, Convention to coordinate,
extend, and assure the fulfill1nent of the existing
treaties between American states, the Argentine
delegation made the following reservation:
"In no case, under Article VI, can foodstuffs or raw materials destined for the civil populations of belligerent coun-
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tries be considered as contraband o:f war, nor shall there
exist any duty to prohibit credits for the acquisition of said
foodstuffs or raw materials which have the destination indicated.
"'Vith reference to the embargo on arms, each Nation may
reserve :freedo1n of action in the face of a war of aggression.''
(Pan American Union, Congres·s and Conference Series, No.
22, p. 40; post p. 168.)
~

Paraguay made a like reservation. (Ibid.)
Restrictio1~ of joint resolution of United States
on expo1'·t of arrns, etc.-The joint resolution pro:
viding for the prohibitio11 of the export of arms,
an1n1unitio11, and implen1ents of war to belligerents,
etc., adopted by the Congress of the United States,
~fay 1, 1937, contained in section 4a a restriction
on its application. This section is as follows:
"SEc. 4. This Act shall not apply to an An1erican republic
or republics engaged in war against a non-American state or
states, provided the American republic is not cooperating
with a non-American state or states in such war."

It is not the intent of the Government of the
United States to apply the provisions of this joint
resolutio11 in wars in which an American republic
or republics may be engaged against a non-American state or states, provided the American state is
not "cooperating" on the non-American side. The
joint resolution would not specially apply when the
war is one wholly between non-American states
even though an American republic should become an
ally of one of the parties.
Prior treaties.-The recent multipartite treaties
among American states have usually contained or
implied a stipulation to the follo,ving effect:
"The present convention does not affect obligations previously undertaken by the contracting parties through international agreements."
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This form appears in the conventions of 1928,
1933, and 1936. Some articles make specific reference to obligations of American states as members of the League of Nations. Modification of
obligations previously existing may in any given
instance be very limited as the provisions of a
prior treat.Y would prevail and the later treaty
\vould merely impose additional obligations as
among the ratifying parties.
Resume.-A belligerent state has in general the
right to regulate the use of its territorial waters.
The right of innocent passage may be claimed by
neutral merchant vessels. There may be and often
is in time of \Var difference of opinion as to wl1at is
meant by tl1e term "innocent passage."
In straits \vhich are the sole waterway between
high seas, if proclaimed war zones, defense areas
or similarly designated, the right of innocent passage n1ay not be prohibited even though such
passage necessarily involves entering territorial
\Vaters.
If a territorial strait, proclaimed a war zone, is
not the sole water,vay between t\vo seas though it
is the more convenient and customary route, the
passage of the strait may be restricted by reasonable military regulations, and passage n1ay even
be prohibited.
Cases involving differences of opinion between
commanders of naval vessels of belligerents and
neutrals in regard to neutral rights of merchant
vessels do not usually demand the i1nmediate resort to force on the part of the neutral. If any
injury to tl1e neutral merchant vessel is not remedied by the belligerent courts, diplon1atic means
are available. In such cases, l1owever, the facts so
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far as ascertainable should be· reported to the
proper authorities and if neutral rights are clearly
violated, formal protest may be made or if in doubt
reasons for the action may be requested.
An innocent merchant vessel in ballast within a
war zone-, but outside territorial 'vaters would not
ordinarily be liable to seizure solely on the ground
of its presence there but the presumption would be
\
that its seizure 'vould not be justified.
If a neutral merchant vessel "\vith cargo has been
seized and if the belligere11t has placed a prize crew
on board, from that time a merchant vessel is under
the military control of the belligerent state and any
protest in regard to further action should be by the
political authorities of the neutral state concerned,
unless the naval commander has special instructions. This is particularly true, as in recent years
the list of articles liable as contraband has varied,
the effect of ultimate destination in determining
the treatment of goods has not been uniform, and
treaty provisions and national legislation have introduced exceptional practices.
In recent wars belligerents have usually extended
the list of contraband as the maintenance of blockade has become increasingly difficult. During the
World War the rule of the llnratified Declaration
of London in regard to the proportion of contraband in the cargo renderi11g the vessel liable as well
as the cargo was usually follo,ved in the prize
courts.
Recently when state8 have "\vithout declaring war
resorted to the use of force against each other,
some states have prohibited the export of certain
articles to the states engaged in the conflict. That
a state engaged in a declared war should consider
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such prohibited exports properly within the category of contraband when bound to an enemy would
seem reasonable even from the point of view of the
neutrals concerned.
Certain states have made it unlawful for their
nationals to travel on vessels of states engaged in
hostilities. A state may also lawflilly forbid ~ its
nationals to travel within the war area during hos~
tilities or may notify them that such tr!avel is at
their own risk. The nationals of any state, when
traveling on a vessel on the high seas,/ are under
the jurisdiction of the state whose flag the vessel
lawfully flies. In treatment of neutral .nationals
on the high seas, belligerents are under obligations
to have due regard for their safety and not to place
them under restraint unless they a:re engaged in
aiding the enemy or emboq.ied in the service of the
enemy.
SOLUTION

(a) (1) The commander of the Bosu should raise
question with the commander of the Y osu as to
whether the Bami has not been illegally seized on
high seas and request the release of the Bami.
(2) The commander of the Bos~t should report
to the Navy Department his action.
(b) (1) As the Zosu has placed a prize crew on
the Lami and is sending the Lami in for adjudication, the commander of the Losu may take no
further action other than to inquire reasons for
capture.
(2) The commander of the Losu should report
the circumstances to Navy Department.
(c) .As oranges may legally be declared contraband and as the entire cargo of the 0 emi may be
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liable to condemnation, the capture of the Ge?n'i
by the Xalu is lawful, and the commander of the
Gosa may take no further action other than to report the facts.
(d) (1) The passengers on tl1e N ami being
under the jurisdiction of state N, no third state
may take action in regard to their safe removal
in time of war by a vessel of war of state Z. This
becomes primarily a matter of concern between
states N and Z. .
(2) The commanders of the Losu and of the Dosu
may request reasons for the action of the Z osu and
report the facts to their Navy Departments for appropriate action. The subsequent treatment of
the nationals of D, L, and M may become a matter
for action of those states.

